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Clausewitz	   has	   much	   to	   tell	   us	   about	   strategy.	   However,	   his	   most	   fundamental	   and	  
enduring	   insights	   are	   obscured	   by	   his	   problematic	   theorizing	   about	   war	   in	   general.	  
Essentially	   the	   same	   insights	  have	  been	  more	   clearly	   and	  economically	   articulated	   in	   the	  
fields	   of	   political	   philosophy	   and	   game	   theory.	  As	   such,	   these	   literatures	   provide	   a	  more	  
accessible	  introduction	  to	  the	  basics	  of	  strategy.	  The	  real	  value	  of	  Clausewitz	  resides	  in	  his	  
profound	  understanding	  of	  how	  basic	  strategic	  dynamics	  play	  out	  in	  the	  specific	  context	  of	  
war.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  
INTRODUCTION	  
Readers	  will,	  I	  hope,	  take	  my	  title	  with	  a	  grain	  of	  salt.	  It	   is	  principally	  intended	  as	  a	  hook	  on	  
which	  to	  draw	  people	  in,	  and	  which	  hopefully	  has	  snagged	  you	  too.	  That	  said,	  the	  purpose	  of	  
this	  essay	   is	   to	  explore	  some	  serious	  problems	  with	  Clausewitz’s	   theory	  of	  war	   that	  have	  not	  
attracted	   the	   attention	   they	   deserve.	   These	   problems	   have	   important	   implications	   for	  
Clausewitz	  scholarship	  generally,	  although	  my	  aim	  here	  is	  to	  examine	  the	  difficulties	  they	  pose	  
for	   anyone	   seeking	   to	   understand	   the	   fundamentals	   of	   military	   strategy.	   For	   although	  
Clausewitz	  certainly	  appreciated	  the	  dynamics	  shaping	  choices	  about	  the	  use	  of	  military	  means	  
for	  political	  ends,	  his	  key	  insights	  in	  this	  regard	  remain	  submerged	  within	  a	  complicated,	  and	  
ultimately	   problematic,	   engagement	  with	   the	   subject	   of	  war	   itself.	   As	   such,	   there	   are	   better	  
starting	   places	   for	   those	  wishing	   to	   grasp	   these	  matters,	   although	   a	   qualified	   reading	   of	  On	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War	  remains	  very	  valuable	  for	  understanding	  the	  specific	  influences	  present	  in	  the	  context	  of	  
military	  operations.	  What	  I	  am	  really	  doing,	  then,	  is	  not	  so	  much	  going	  beyond	  Clausewitz	  as	  
beginning	  somewhere	  else	  first.1	  
	  	  	  	  	  Clausewitz	  has	  suffered	  from	  his	  fair	  share	  of	  detractors	  over	  the	  years.	  Jomini	  declared	  him	  
too	   abstruse	   to	   be	   of	   value	   to	   soldiers,	  whilst	   Liddell	  Hart	   subsequently	   denounced	  him	   for	  
exaggerating	  the	  centrality	  of	  battle	  to	  warfare.2	  More	  recently	  he	  has	  been	  criticized	  for	  over-­‐
emphasizing	   the	  political	   instrumentality	  of	  war,	  and	   for	   lacking	   relevance	   to	  wars	   involving	  
non-­‐state	   actors.3	  With	   the	   exception	   of	   Jomini	   (himself	   hardly	   a	  model	   of	   clarity),	   none	   of	  
these	   criticisms	   can	   really	   be	   considered	   to	   have	   struck	   home.	   Indeed,	   one	   of	   the	   most	  
impressive	   features	   of	   Clausewitz’s	   work	   is	   its	   continuing	   relevance	   across	   a	   wide	   range	   of	  
historical	  contexts.	  
	  	  	  	  	  Despite	  Clausewitz’s	  many	  strengths,	  however,	  we	  should	  be	  careful	  to	  acknowledge	  certain	  
serious	   shortcomings	  with	  his	   theory	  of	  war,	  which	   remained	  unresolved	  at	  his	  death.	   If	   the	  
argument	   he	   famously	   set	   out	   in	   the	   first	   chapter	   of	  On	  War	   feels	   unduly	   complicated	   and	  
poorly	  structured,	   it	   is	  because	   it	   is	   just	  that.	  Although	  he	  pronounced	  himself	  satisfied	  with	  
the	  result,	  and	  intended	  to	  revise	  the	  rest	  of	  his	  book	  accordingly,	  he	  was	  wrong	  to	  do	  so.4	  As	  
such,	   Raymond	   Aron	   is	   too	   generous	   when	   he	   lauds	   the	   chapter	   for	   “the	   perfection	   of	   its	  
rigorous	  analysis.”	  
It	   allows	  us	   [he	   continues]	   to	   imagine	  what	   the	  work	   could	  have	  been	  had	   the	   author	  
lived	  a	   few	  more	  years.	   It	   also	   indicates	   the	   last	   steps	  of	   a	   train	  of	   thought	   seeking	   its	  
final	   expression.	   Fortunately,	   for	   the	   attentive	   reader,	   it	   reveals	   the	   entire	   conceptual	  
network	  that	  structures	  Clausewitz’s	  theoretical	  stance.5	  
To	   be	   sure,	   reading	   Chapter	  One	   can	   help	   us	   imagine	   a	   very	   different	   book.	   But	   that	   book	  
would	   in	   practice	   have	   required	   a	   new	   starting	   point,	   because	   there	   is	   no	   reaching	   it	   from	  
where	  Clausewitz	  left	  off.	  If	  the	  chapter	  contains	  “the	  last	  steps	  of	  a	  chain	  of	  thought”,	   it	   is	  a	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chain	   that	   reaches	   no	   satisfactory	   conclusion;	   if	   it	   exposes	   Clausewitz’s	   “entire	   conceptual	  
network”,	  it	  is	  one	  that	  is	  fundamentally	  flawed.	  
	  	  	  	  	  In	   the	   next	   section	   I	   review	   Clausewitz’s	   argument	   in	   order	   to	   highlight	   some	   of	   its	  
problems.	  To	  be	  clear:	  I	  am	  not	  seeking	  to	  chart	  the	  development	  of	  his	  thinking	  about	  war,	  or	  
to	   locate	   it	   within	   the	   broader	   intellectual	   currents	   of	   German	   idealist	   philosophy.	   These	  
things	  have	  been	  done	  before.6	  Instead	  my	  purpose	  is	  to	  hold	  what	  is	  written	  in	  Chapter	  One	  to	  
some	  minimum	   standards	   of	   logic,	   and	   show	   that	   it	   does	   not	  meet	   them.	   In	   doing	   so	   it	   is	  
necessary	   to	   infer	   something	   of	   the	   premises	   underpinning	   the	   initial	   steps	   of	   Clausewitz’s	  
argument—as	   they	  pertain	   to	   the	  ontology	  of	  war	  and	   its	   relationship	  with	  human	  agency—
because	  it	  would	  be	  difficult	  to	  follow	  his	  reasoning	  otherwise.	  Still,	  I	  have	  tried	  to	  keep	  such	  
inferences	  to	  a	  minimum.	  
	  	  	  	  	  Thereafter	   I	   seek	   to	   show	   that,	   problems	   aside,	   Clausewitz	   does	   succeed	   in	   articulating	  
some	   key	   insights	   into	   strategic	   matters.	   Although	   these	   are	   obscured	   by	   the	   attendant	  
muddle,	  they	  are	  nevertheless	  there	  to	  be	  picked	  out.	  Demonstrating	  this	  involves	  a	  brief	  foray	  
into	   the	   fields	  of	  political	  philosophy	  and	  game	   theory,	   in	  order	   to	   expose	   a	   shared	   concern	  
with	   the	   same	   strategic	   dynamics	   that	   Clausewitz	   identifies.	   The	   degree	   of	   consilience	   here	  
suggests	   that,	  whatever	   else	  may	  be	  problematic	   about	  Chapter	  One,	   its	   strategic	   content	   is	  
sound	  enough	  in	  fundamental	  terms.	  I	  conclude	  with	  some	  comments	  about	  what	  this	  might	  
mean	  for	  the	  role	  of	  Clausewitz	  in	  the	  study	  of	  military	  strategy.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  
CLAUSEWITZ’S	  PROJECT	  
Clausewitz	   defines	   strategy	   as	   the	   “use	   of	   battles	   for	   the	   purpose	   of	   the	   war”—the	   purpose	  
being	   political	   in	   nature.	   He	   also	   notes	   that	   this	   need	   not	   always	   involve	   fighting,	   that	  
sometimes	   strategy	  can	   “use”	  battles	  merely	  by	  exploiting	   the	   threat	   to	   fight.7	  This	   is	  helpful	  
for	  present	  purposes	  because	   it	   suggests	   that	  Clausewitz	  understands	  strategy	   in	  broadly	   the	  
same	  way	  that	  we	  do	  today.	  In	  other	  words,	   it	  exists	  at	  the	  interface	  between	  military	  means	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and	  political	  ends,	  and	  it	  “works”	  via	  processes	  of	  compulsion	  and	  coercion.8	  Having	  said	  that,	  
Clausewitz	  reveals	  nothing	  much	  here	  about	  the	  underpinning	  dynamics	  of	  strategic	  choice,	  or	  
about	   how	   decisions	   are	  made.	   To	   understand	   his	   views	   on	   such	  matters	  we	   need	   to	   begin	  
from	  his	  engagement	  with	  the	  broader	  issue	  of	  war	  tout	  court.	  
	  	  	  	  	  Clausewitz	  remains	  important	  today	  because	  he	  sought	  to	  produce	  a	  trans-­‐historical	  theory	  
of	  war,	  and	  because	  he	  partially	  succeeded	  in	  doing	  so.	  He	  criticized	  the	  military	  theorists	  of	  
his	   own	   time	   for	   their	   tendency	   to	   base	   grand	   claims	   on	   questionable	   foundations.	   Their	  
method,	   he	   observed,	   was	   to	   derive	   principles	   for	   the	   conduct	   of	   war	   from	   what	   they	  
considered	   to	   be	   its	   governing	   operational	   aspect.	   The	   problem	   was	   that	   their	   various	  
candidates	   in	   this	   regard	   were	   overly	   particular,	   and	   biased	   towards	   considerations	   of	  
mathematical	   calculability.	   Thus	   although	   their	   work	   might	   succeed	   in	   illuminating	   some	  
specific	  aspect	  of	  warfare—the	  importance	  of	  troop	  numbers,	  base	  of	  operations,	  interior	  lines	  
and	   the	   like—their	   resulting	   theories	   lacked	   anything	   approaching	   general	   applicability.9	  
Clausewitz	  considered	  that	  the	  way	  to	  avoid	  problems	  of	  this	  kind	  was	  to	  begin	  from	  a	  more	  
fundamental	   starting-­‐point.	   As	   such,	   his	   own	   preferred	  method	  was	   to	   deduce	   principles	   of	  
war,	  not	  from	  some	  partial	  aspect	  of	  military	  operations,	  but	  from	  the	  nature	  of	  war	  itself—or	  
at	  least	  what	  he	  considered	  its	  nature	  to	  be.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  In	  seeking	  to	  employ	  the	  nature	  of	  war	  as	  his	  starting	  point,	  Clausewitz	  was	  drawing	  on	  the	  
venerable	   doctrine	   of	   essentialism. 10 	  Specifically,	   his	   ontological	   assumption	   was	   that	   all	  
instances	  of	  X	   share	   a	  unique	  and	  unvarying	  essence	   that	   is	   responsible	   for	   their	   identity	   as	  
members	   of	   the	   category	   X.	   This	   led	   him	   to	   assume	   that	   the	   manifest	   properties	   of	   X	   are	  
logically	  entailed	  by	  its	  essence,	  and	  that	  any	  causal	  powers	  X	  possesses	  are	  similarly	  entailed	  
by	  these	  properties.	   In	  other	  words,	  not	  only	  do	  essences	  determine	  the	  properties	  of	  things,	  
but	   they	   also	   endow	   them	   with	   determinate	   powers—powers,	   that	   is,	   whose	   modes	   of	  
operation	   must	   be	   understood	   and	   accommodated	   in	   the	   process	   of	   turning	   them	   to	  
instrumental	   account.11	  It	   is	   therefore	   easy	   to	   appreciate	   why	   Clausewitz	   would	   have	   found	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such	  a	  doctrine	  congenial.	  To	  state	  the	  essence	  of	  war	  would	  (at	  least	  in	  principle)	  permit	  him	  
to	  deduce	   its	  causal	  powers,	   from	  which	  he	  would	  (again	   in	  principle)	  be	  able	  to	  deduce	   the	  
single	  valid	  account	  of	  how	  one	  should	  conduct	  it.	  Indeed,	  it	  was	  in	  this	  spirit	  that	  he	  viewed	  
the	  “scientific”	  aspect	  of	  his	  project	  as	  residing	  in	  “the	  endeavour	  to	  investigate	  the	  essence	  of	  
military	  phenomena,	  to	  grasp	  their	  connection	  with	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  things	  from	  which	  they	  
proceed”,	  and	  that	  he	  likewise	  describes	  “clear	  ideas”	  about	  strategy	  as	  those	  that	  “are	  logically	  
connected	  to	  their	  underlying	  necessity.”12	  
	  
Starting	  Point	  
Clausewitz’s	  essentialism	  is	  evident	  in	  the	  title	  of	  Chapter	  One,	  which,	  appropriately	  enough,	  
asks	  “What	  is	  War?”13	  In	  answering	  this	  question	  he	  proposes	  to	  restrict	  himself	  to	  the	  essence	  
[Element]	  of	  the	  matter,	  which	  he	  characterizes	  as	  a	  duel.	  
War	   is	  nothing	  but	  a	  duel	  on	  a	  grander	  scale.	  Were	  we	  to	  consider	  as	  a	  single	  unit	  the	  
countless	   individual	   duels	   that	   comprise	   a	   war,	   we	   should	   do	   well	   to	   imagine	   two	  
wrestlers.	   Each	   strives	   by	   means	   of	   physical	   force	   to	   make	   the	   other	   do	   his	   will;	   his	  
immediate	  aim	  is	  to	  cast	  down	  his	  adversary,	  thereby	  rendering	  him	  incapable	  of	  offering	  
further	  resistance.	  
	  	  	  	  	  War	  is,	  therefore,	  an	  act	  of	  force	  intended	  to	  compel	  our	  adversary	  to	  do	  our	  will.14	  
Clausewitz	  effectively	  derives	  three	  key	  properties	  of	  war	   from	  this	  starting	  point:	   the	  means	  
(force);	  the	  end	  (compulsion);	  and	  an	  adversary.15	  From	  here	  he	  attempts	  to	  deduce	  necessary	  
consequences	  for	  the	  conduct	  of	  war,	  the	  result	  being	  some	  of	  the	  best-­‐known	  passages	  in	  his	  
book.16	  In	   brief,	   the	   resort	   to	   force	   by	   two	   opposed	   parties	   should	   always	   produce	   extreme	  
efforts	  as	  each	  side	  seeks	   to	   impose	   its	  will	  on	   the	  other.	  More	  specifically,	  each	  side	  should	  
endeavour	   to	   disarm	   its	   adversary	   as	   rapidly	   as	   possible,	   out	   of	   concern	   to	   avoid	   being	  
disarmed	   itself.	   This	   should	   also	   entail	   each	   side	   employing	   maximum	   force	   in	   a	   bid	   to	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compress	   its	   military	   operations	   into	   the	   shortest	   possible	   time.	   Military	   victory	   should,	   in	  
other	  words,	   go	   to	   the	   side	   that	   applies	   the	   greater	   force	   in	   the	   shorter	   time.	   According	   to	  
Clausewitz	  the	  logical	  conclusion	  of	  this	  rush	  to	  extremes	  is	  the	  state	  of	  “absolute”	  war,	  which	  
he	   characterizes	   (perhaps	   with	   the	   analogy	   of	   a	   capacitor	   in	   mind)	   as	   an	   instantaneous	  
discharge	   of	   force.17	  The	   strategic	   prescription	   that	   emerges	   at	   this	   preliminary	   stage	   of	   his	  
argument	   is	   that,	   regardless	  of	   the	  political	  differences	  giving	   rise	   to	  war,	  one	  should	  always	  
pursue	  its	  absolute	  form.	  	  	  
	  
War:	  Absolute	  and	  Real	  
One	   of	   the	  most	   interesting	   things	   about	   the	   idea	   of	   absolute	   war	   is	   the	   trouble	   it	   caused	  
Clausewitz,	  even	  as	  it	  sparked	  in	  his	  mind	  new	  insights	  about	  his	  subject	  more	  generally.	  The	  
problem	   lies	   in	   the	   disjuncture	   between	   absolute	  war,	   and	  war	   as	   it	   is	   conducted	   in	   reality.	  
Thus	   far	  Clausewitz’s	   theory	   can	  accommodate	  only	   two	   states	  of	  being:	  peace	   and	  absolute	  
war.	   And	   yet	   the	   conduct	   of	   real	   war,	   as	   revealed	   by	   the	   historical	   record,	   always	   falls	  
substantially	   short	   of	   the	   absolute.	   It	   occupies,	   in	   other	   words,	   a	   space	   between	   peace	   and	  
absolute	  war	  whose	  existence	  his	  theory	  at	  this	  point	  denies.18	  
	  	  	  	  Clausewitz	   seeks	   to	   explain	   this	   disjuncture	   by	   arguing	   that	   the	   pursuit	   of	   absolute	   war	  
requires	  inordinate	  effort.	  This	  effort	  is	  frequently	  too	  great	  in	  proportion	  to	  our	  desired	  ends,	  
and	  consequently	  we	  baulk	  at	  making	   it.	   Instead	  we	   look	   for	  ways	  of	   furthering	  our	  goals	  at	  
more	  manageable	  cost,	  and	  reality	  offers	  us	  certain	  opportunities	   in	   this	   respect.	  Firstly,	   real	  
wars	  are	  not	  disembodied	  affairs	  fought	  in	  a	  historical	  vacuum.	  Rather,	  they	  occur	  in	  the	  light	  
of	  precedents	  that	  help	  us	  anticipate	  how	  earnestly	  our	  adversary	  will	  pursue	  absolute	  war	  this	  
time	   around,	   and	   that	   encourage	   us	   to	   adjust	   our	   own	   efforts	   accordingly.	   Secondly,	   armed	  
forces	  are	  dispersed	  across	  space	  and	  time,	  meaning	  that	  our	  adversary	  will	  experience	  delays	  
in	   committing	   the	   forces	  he	  proposes	   to	  use.	  These	  delays	  will	   likely	   allow	  us	   to	   rectify	   any	  
initial	   shortfalls	   that	  subsequently	  become	  evident	   in	  relation	  to	  our	  own	  military	  efforts.	  At	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least	   initially,	   therefore,	   we	   can	   afford	   to	   practise	   moderation	   in	   this	   respect.	   Thirdly,	  
Clausewitz	   contends	   that	   any	   consequences	   suffered	   as	   a	   result	   of	   defeat	   in	   war	   might	  
plausibly	  be	  reversed	  at	  some	  future	  date;	  nothing	  is	  final	  in	  this	  regard.	  Together	  these	  three	  
“modifications	   in	   reality”	   encourage	   rational,	   utility-­‐maximizing	   belligerents	   to	   temper	   their	  
pursuit	  of	  the	  absolute	  on	  grounds	  that	  their	  adversaries	  will	  likely	  be	  willing	  to	  reciprocate	  in	  
kind.	   In	  this	  manner,	  claims	  Clausewitz,	   the	  political	  stakes	  that	  give	  rise	  to	  war	  are	  allowed	  
entry	   into	   strategic	   calculations,	   governing	   decisions	   about	   military	   objectives	   and	  
commitment	   of	   force.	   This	   explains	   how	  wars	   can	   involve	  military	   action	   at	   any	   point	   on	   a	  
spectrum	   ranging	   from	   the	   unlimited	   use	   of	   force	   at	   one	   end,	   to	   armed	   observation	   at	   the	  
other.19	  
	  	  	  	  	  But	  note	  what	  has	  happened	  here.	  Having	  begun	  with	  the	  intention	  of	  deducing	  his	  theory	  
from	  the	  essence	  of	  war	  itself,	  Clausewitz	  almost	  immediately	  finds	  it	  necessary	  to	  introduce	  a	  
range	   of	   incidental	   factors	   (his	   modifications)	   in	   order	   to	   align	   his	   deductions	   with	  
intransigent	  reality.	  These	  modifications	  are	  intuitively	  plausible	  as	  sources	  of	  moderation	  over	  
military	   action	   in	   their	   own	   right.	   From	   an	   essentialist	   perspective,	   however,	   the	   need	   to	  
introduce	   them	   indicates	   a	   problem	  with	   his	   initial	   definition	   of	  war	   and/or	   his	   deductions	  
from	  this	  starting	  point.	  His	  next	  step,	  moreover,	  only	  serves	  to	  compound	  the	  situation.	  
	  
Offence	  and	  Defence	  
Having	   claimed	   to	   explain	   the	   disparity	   between	   absolute	   and	   real	   war,	   Clausewitz	   now	  
contradicts	  himself	  by	  pointing	  to	  another	  disjuncture	  between	  theory	  and	  practice	  that	  is	  not	  
resolved	  by	  his	  three	  modifications—namely	  that	  real	  war	   involves	  periodic	   inaction	  on	  both	  
sides.	  This,	  he	  argues,	  should	  not	  be	  so	  because	  any	  circumstances	  that	  promote	   inaction	  by	  
one	  side	  also	  provide	  an	  opportunity	  for	  the	  other	  side	  to	  exploit	  via	  continued	  action.	  Quite	  
apart	   from	  his	   foregoing	  modifications,	   therefore,	   action	   in	  war	   should	  never	   be	   suspended.	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The	  tight	  coupling	  between	  action	  and	  reaction	  remains	  in	  place,	  keeping	  us	  on	  the	  fast	  track	  
to	  absolute	  war.	  
	  	  	  	  	  Clausewitz	   seeks	   to	   resolve	   this	   additional	   disparity	   with	   reference	   to	   the	   influence	   of	  
defensive	  operations	   in	  war.	  The	  defensive,	  he	  argues,	   is	   stronger	   than	   the	  offensive	   form	  of	  
war.	  Consequently	  the	  weaker	  of	  two	  belligerents	  may	  adopt	  a	  defensive	  posture	  to	  offset	  the	  
advantages	  enjoyed	  by	  a	  more	  powerful	  adversary.	  In	  such	  circumstances,	  this	  adversary	  may	  
not	  be	  strong	  enough	  to	  attack	  the	  defender	  with	  confidence	  of	  success,	  and	  will	  therefore	  halt	  
operations	   until	   circumstances	   change	   for	   the	   better.	   Meanwhile,	   the	   weaker	   side	   cannot	  
exploit	   this	   opportunity	   by	   switching	   to	   the	   offensive	   without	   sacrificing	   the	   advantages	  
associated	  with	   its	   defensive	   posture.	   Consequently	   both	   sides	   temporarily	   suspend	  military	  
action.20	  
	  	  	  	  	  But	  whilst	  the	  superior	  strength	  of	  the	  defensive	  can	  explain	  inaction	  in	  real	  war,	  it	  does	  so	  
only	   by	   further	   undermining	   Clausewitz’s	   essentialism.	   As	   Azar	   Gat	   has	   noted,	   Clausewitz	  
never	  satisfactorily	  explains	  what	  it	  is	  about	  war	  itself	  that	  makes	  the	  defensive	  stronger	  than	  
the	  offensive.	  To	  be	  sure,	  he	  does	  elsewhere	  contend	  that	  a	  benefit	  that	  “arises	  solely	  from	  the	  
nature	  of	  war,	  derives	  from	  the	  advantage	  of	  position,	  which	  tends	  to	  favour	  the	  defence.”	  But	  
this	  can	  only	  be	  an	  argument	  about	  incidental	  factors,	  because	  war	  is	  not	  always	  fought	  upon	  
terrain	   that	   lends	   itself	   to	   such	   an	   explanation.	  War	   at	   sea	   can	  be	   fought	   defensively	   in	   the	  
absence	  of	  such	  terrain,	  as	  can	  war	  in	  the	  air.21	  Here,	  therefore,	  is	  additional	  evidence	  of	  some	  
fault	  in	  Clausewitz’s	  argument.	  
	  
War	  Games	  
Evidently	  undaunted	  by	  the	  problems	  left	  in	  his	  wake,	  Clausewitz	  moves	  on	  to	  discuss	  the	  role	  
played	   by	   incomplete	   knowledge	   in	   restraining	   the	   conduct	   of	   war.	   Neither	   side	   can	   know	  
everything	   about	   the	   other’s	   dispositions,	   he	   observes.	   As	   such,	   misjudgements	   about	   the	  
situation	   can	   lead	   to	   false	   conclusions	   about	   which	   side	   possesses	   the	   initiative.	   One	   side	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might,	   therefore,	   pause	   when	   it	   would	   have	   been	   better	   served	   by	   pressing	   on.	   Clausewitz	  
acknowledges	   that	  misjudgements	  of	   this	   kind	   could	   as	   easily	   contribute	   to	   an	  unwarranted	  
acceleration	   of	   military	   operations,	   as	   to	   an	   unwarranted	   pause.	   He	   argues,	   however,	   that	  
human	  nature	  is	  more	  likely	  to	  overestimate	  threats	  than	  underestimate	  them,	  with	  the	  result	  
that	   incomplete	   knowledge	   tends	   disproportionately	   to	   slow	   operations.	   This,	   in	   its	   turn,	  
works	   to	   dilute	   the	   escalatory	   relationship	   between	   action	   and	   reaction	   by	   providing	   more	  
time	  for	  mistakes	  to	  be	  corrected.	  And	  in	  doing	  so,	   it	  encourages	  the	  expenditure	  of	  military	  
efforts	   in	   accordance	   with	   real-­‐world	   calculations	   of	   probability	   rather	   than	   abstract	  
conceptions	  of	  necessity.	  War	  from	  this	  perspective,	  concludes	  Clausewitz,	  resembles	  nothing	  
so	  much	  as	  a	  game	  of	  cards	  where	  chance	  figures	  prominently	  in	  the	  outcome.22	  	  	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  As	  with	  his	  treatment	  of	  attack	  and	  defence,	  however,	  the	  problem	  here	  is	  that	  Clausewitz	  
bases	   the	   influence	   of	   incomplete	   knowledge	   on	   something	   external	   to	   war	   itself—namely	  
human	   nature.	   It	   is	   because	   people	   are	   prone	   to	   exaggerate	   threats,	   rather	   than	   anything	  
intrinsic	  to	  war	  as	  such,	  that	  military	  decisions	  are	  further	  removed	  from	  the	  realm	  of	  logical	  
necessity.	   To	   be	   sure,	   appeals	   to	   human	   nature	   as	   explanations	   for	   behaviour	   are	   not	   in	  
themselves	   necessarily	   problematic.	   The	   issue	   in	   this	   case	   is	   really	   one	   of	   consistency.	   The	  
seemingly	   ad	   hoc	   introduction	   of	   human	   nature	   at	   this	   point	   begs	   questions	   about	   its	  
relevance	  to	  the	  previous	  stages	  of	  Clausewitz’s	  argument.	  	  
	  
War	  as	  a	  Continuation	  of	  Politics	  (or	  Policy)23	  
By	  now,	  Clausewitz’s	  essentialism	  is	  well	  and	  truly	  buried	  under	  a	  mass	  of	   incidental	   factors.	  
These	   are,	   moreover,	   piled	   hodgepodge	   one	   upon	   the	   other,	   seemingly	   in	   the	   order	   they	  
occurred	  to	  him,	  the	  overall	  result	  being	  as	  inelegant	  as	  it	  is	  unconvincing.	  How,	  then,	  does	  he	  
seek	   to	   extricate	   himself	   from	   this	   awkward	   position?	   He	   effectively	   switches	   ontological	  
horses	   in	   mid-­‐stream,	   by	   re-­‐defining	   war	   as	   “merely	   the	   continuation	   of	   politics	   by	   other	  
means.”24	  Here,	   in	   other	   words,	   he	   explicitly	   contradicts	   his	   initial	   essentialism	   by	   claiming	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that	   war	   is	   actually	   an	   expression	   of	   some	   other	   more	   fundamental	   activity.	   As	   Clausewitz	  
himself	  puts	  it,	  “war	  is	  never	  something	  autonomous.	  Rather,	  it	  should	  be	  regarded	  as	  a	  tool	  of	  
politics,	  and	  only	  by	  considering	  it	  as	  such	  can	  we	  avoid	  coming	  into	  conflict	  with	  the	  whole	  of	  
military	  history.”25	  The	  problem	  here	  hardly	  needs	  highlighting:	   in	  his	   effort	   to	  keep	  himself	  
aligned	  with	  history,	  he	  ends	  up	  with	  two	  incompatible	  definitions	  of	  the	  same	  thing.	  War	  as	  a	  
heteronymous	   “continuation	   of	   politics”	   is	   set	   against	   war	   as	   an	   autonomous	   “act	   of	   force”.	  




And	  thus,	  by	  fits	  and	  starts,	  we	  finally	  arrive	  at	  Clausewitz’s	  third—“trinitarian”—definition	  of	  
war	  as	  a	  product	  of	   its	   three	  “ruling	  tendencies”:	   reason,	  chance	  and	  passion.	  The	  trinity	  has	  
been	   the	   subject	   of	  much	  debate	   in	   recent	   years.	   This,	   however,	   has	   focused	   on	   its	   salience	  
within	   Clausewitz’s	   overall	   conception	   of	   war,	   rather	   than	   its	   relationship	   with	   his	   prior	  
theoretical	   commitments—or,	   for	   that	  matter,	   its	   internal	   coherence.	   For	   some	   it	   is	   his	   key	  
insight	   into	   the	   theory	   of	   war;	   for	   others	   it	   is	   nothing	   more	   than	   a	   historically	   situated	  
observation	  on	  the	  character	  of	  early-­‐nineteenth-­‐century	  warfare.26	  This	  latter	  position	  seems	  
to	   stem	   from	   a	   misreading	   of	   the	   text.	   In	   practice	   Clausewitz	   merely	   seeks	   to	   clarify	   his	  
account	  of	  the	  trinity’s	  components	  by	  reference	  to	  the	  interstate	  wars	  of	  his	  own	  time.	  Hence	  
chance	  he	  equates	  with	   the	  environment	   in	  which	  generals	  and	   their	  armies	  operate;	   reason	  
with	  the	  political	  realm	  of	  government,	  and	  passion	  with	  the	  influence	  of	  popular	  involvement	  
in	   the	  war.27	  Thus	   to	  maintain,	   as	   some	  have,	   that	   the	   trinity	   refers	  only	   to	  warfare	  between	  
states—to	  warfare,	  that	  is,	  in	  which	  there	  exist	  clear	  divisions	  between	  army,	  government	  and	  
people—is	   incorrect.	   The	   trinity’s	  more	   general	   expression	   as	   chance,	   reason	   and	   passion	   is	  
meant	  to	  capture	  a	  much	  more	  fundamental	  set	  of	  dynamics.	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  Nevertheless,	   claims	   that	   the	   trinity	   is	  Clausewitz’s	   key	   theoretical	   insight	   are	   difficult	   to	  
accept.	  Partly	  this	  is	  because	  it	  characterizes	  war	  as	  an	  emergent	  property	  of	  the	  interactions	  
between	   three	   independent	   variables,	   which	   once	   again	   puts	   it	   at	   odds	  with	   his	   essentialist	  
starting	   point.	   And	   partly	   it	   is	   because	   his	   comparison	   of	   the	   theory	   of	   war	   with	   a	  magnet	  
suspended	   between	   the	   three	   poles	   of	   chance,	   reason	   and	   passion	   is	   unhelpful	   on	   its	   own	  
terms.	  The	   implication	  here	   is	   that	   each	  of	   these	  poles	  will	   vary	   in	   strength	  over	   time,	   such	  
that	  the	  magnet	  will	  be	  pulled	  hither	  and	  thither,	  now	  closer	  to	  one	  of	  them,	  now	  to	  another.	  
The	  problem	  with	   this	   image	   is	   that	   it	   establishes	  a	  mutually	  exclusive	   relationship	  between	  
chance,	  reason	  and	  passion:	  to	  be	  increasingly	  influenced	  by	  one	  of	  them	  is	  to	  be	  decreasingly	  
influenced	  by	  the	  others,	  and	  vice	  versa.	  The	  reality	  of	  war	  suggests	  otherwise.	  Belligerents	  can	  
be	   both	   passionate	   and	   reasonable;	   they	   can	   possess,	   in	   other	   words,	   a	   terrible	   sense	   of	  
purpose.	  And	  nor	  is	  reason	  or	  passion	  self-­‐evidently	  incompatible	  with	  a	  run	  of	  bad	  luck.	  
	  	  	  	  	  Some	   scholars	   have	   abandoned	   talk	   of	   poles	   and	   magnets	   in	   favour	   of	   a	   hierarchical	  
relationship	   between	   the	   trinity’s	   components.	   From	   this	   perspective,	   the	   popular	   passions	  
generated	   by	   war	   are	   ordered	   into	   efficient	  military	   activity	   (in	   the	   face	   of	   chance)	   for	   use	  
under	  the	  guidance	  of	  political	  reason.	  Not	  only	  do	  formulations	  of	  this	  kind	  dispense	  with	  the	  
image	  of	  war	  wandering	  around	  between	  three	  mutually	  exclusive	  poles,	  but	  they	  also	  suggest	  
a	   meaningful	   distinction	   between	   war	   as	   a	   continuation	   of	   politics	   and	   of	   policy.	   Here	   the	  
popular	  passions	  generated	  by	  war	  may	  be	  considered	  a	  function	  of	  the	  political	  complexion	  of	  
the	   belligerents	   (for	   example:	   eighteenth-­‐century	   dynastic	   states	   versus	   nineteenth-­‐century	  
nation-­‐states)	   whilst	   the	   conduct	   of	   military	   operations	   is	   shaped	   to	   conform	   with	   their	  
specific	  policy	  goals.28	  Note,	  though,	  that	  reformulating	  the	  trinity	  in	  this	  manner	  is	  achieved	  
at	   the	   cost	   of	   shifting	   the	  means	   of	   war	   from	   physical,	   to	  moral,	   force.	   This	   is	   problematic	  
given	  Clausewitz’s	  early	  assertion	  that	  the	  latter	  has	  no	  place	  within	  his	  original	  conception	  of	  
war,	  there	  being	  “no	  moral	  force	  apart	  from	  the	  concepts	  of	  states	  and	  law”.29	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A	  Logical	  Error	  
It	   is	  curious,	  therefore,	  that	  Clausewitz	  pronounced	  himself	  satisfied	  with	  the	  first	  chapter	  of	  
On	   War.	   To	   be	   sure,	   it	   remains	   one	   of	   the	   most	   important	   treatments	   of	   the	   relationship	  
between	  politics	  and	  war	  we	  possess.	  It	  contains	  passages	  of	  unsurpassed	  insight	  in	  this	  regard.	  
And	  yet	  these	  passages	  remain	  isolated	  islands	  of	  lucidity,	  unconnected	  by	  any	  coherent	  line	  of	  
argument.	  The	  serial	  re-­‐characterization	  of	  war—which	  starts	  from	  an	  essentialist	  position	  and	  
ends	  with	  more	  than	  a	  whiff	  of	  constructivism	  about	  it—does	  not	  work	  in	  this	  regard.	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  How,	  then,	  did	  Clausewitz	  get	  himself	   into	  this	  position?	  To	  answer	  this	  question	  we	  first	  
need	   to	   appreciate	   that	   he	   made	   a	   logical	   error	   at	   an	   early	   stage	   in	   his	   argument.	   Having	  
deduced	   from	  his	  original	  definition	  of	  war	   that	   the	  use	  of	   force	   tends	   to	   extremes	   (as	   each	  
side	  endeavours	  to	  out-­‐match	  the	  other)	  he	  then	  proceeds	  to	  argue	  that	  this	  dynamic	  interplay	  
necessarily	   rules	   out	   self-­‐imposed	   moderation	   in	   relation	   to	   war’s	   conduct.	   Even	   under	  
circumstances	   in	  which	   the	  prospect	  of	  disarmament	  might	   reasonably	  be	  expected	   to	  bring	  
about	   an	   early	   surrender	   by	   one	   side,	   the	   other	  must	   not	   renege	   on	   its	   extreme	   efforts.	   All	  
military	   action	   must,	   in	   other	   words,	   accord	   with	   the	   goal	   of	   disarming	   one’s	   adversary	   as	  
rapidly	  as	  possible.	  From	  here	  it	  is	  but	  a	  short	  distance	  to	  the	  concept	  of	  absolute	  war.	  But	  as	  
W.	  B.	  Gallie	  once	  observed,	  it	  is	  erroneous	  to	  argue	  that	  the	  possibility	  of	  an	  adversary’s	  early	  
surrender	  cannot	  influence	  military	  action;	  the	  most	  we	  are	  entitled	  to	  assert	  in	  this	  regard	  is	  
that	  it	  need	  not.	  Indeed,	  if	  the	  possibility	  exists	  of	  an	  early	  surrender	  by	  one	  side,	  the	  other	  is	  
logically	   bound	   to	   consider	   whether	   extreme	   military	   action	   (given	   the	   likely	   costs)	   is	  
warranted	  under	  these	  circumstances.30	  
	  	  	  	  	  It	   was	   this	   misstep	   that	   directed	   Clausewitz	   down	   a	   false	   path	   to	   absolute	   war,	   thereby	  
distancing	  his	  theory	  from	  historical	  practice.	  And	  it	  was	  his	  failure	  to	  recognize	  this	  mistake	  
that	   resulted	   in	  his	   problematic	   attempts	   to	   redress	  matters.	  Had	  he	  originally	   realized	   that	  
war’s	  tendency	  to	  extremes	  of	  violence	  does	  not	  logically	  preclude	  limited	  military	  efforts,	  he	  
might	  have	  spared	  himself	  much	  nugatory	  work.	  He	  would	  have	  needed	  to	  begin	  anew,	  with	  a	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revised	   concept	  of	  war	   that	   captures	   its	   status	   as	  both	  an	  act	  of	   force	   and	  a	   continuation	  of	  
politics.	  But,	  by	  keeping	  politics	  firmly	  in	  the	  picture,	  he	  would	  have	  supplied	  himself	  with	  a	  
countervailing	  influence	  against	  the	  rush	  to	  absolute	  war,	  thereby	  removing	  the	  need	  for	  this	  
latter	  concept.	  Exactly	  what	  this	  revised	  position	  on	  war	  might	  have	  looked	  like	  is	  interesting	  
to	  consider	  but	  need	  not	  detain	  us	  here,	  our	  concern	  being	  with	  strategy	  rather	  than	  war	  per	  
se.	  	  
	  
THE	  CHALLENGE	  OF	  STRATEGY	  
The	   important	  point	   for	  our	  purposes	   is	   that	   a	   compound	   (force/politics)	   idea	  of	  war	  would	  
likely	  have	  served	  to	  clarify	  what	  Clausewitz	  evidently	  considers	  the	  fundamental	  challenge	  of	  
military	   strategy—which	   is	   to	  determine	  how	  much	  military	  effort	   is	  warranted	   in	  any	  given	  
instance	  of	  war.31	  Over	  the	  course	  of	  Chapter	  One,	  he	  shifts	  position	  on	  this	  question.	  As	  war	  
morphs	  from	  an	  act	  of	  force	  into	  a	  continuation	  of	  politics,	  so	  too	  does	  the	  focus	  move	  from	  
compulsion	   (via	   force	   applied)	   to	   coercion	   (via	   force	   threatened).	  And	  with	   it,	   the	  optimum	  
level	   of	   force	   required	   moves	   from	   the	   maximum	   possible	   to	   the	   minimum	   necessary.	  
Consequently—but	  not	  very	  obviously—military	   strategy	  emerges	  as	  a	  matter	  of	   striking	   the	  
optimum	  balance	   in	   this	   regard.	  On	   the	   one	   hand,	   too	   little	   effort	  will	   fail	   to	   coerce	  whilst	  
handing	  military	   opportunities	   to	   the	   enemy;	   on	   the	   other,	   too	  much	   effort	  will	   render	   the	  
costs	   of	   fighting	   disproportionately	   high	   in	   relation	   to	   the	   political	   benefits	   stemming	   from	  
victory.	  Thus	  decisions	   about	  military	   effort	   should	   reflect	   as	   faithfully	   as	  possible	   the	   value	  
each	  side	  attaches	  to	  achieving	  its	  political	  ends,	  which	  is	  why	  Clausewitz	  contends	  that	  “the	  
first	   and	   most	   comprehensive	   of	   all	   strategic	   questions”	   is	   to	   understand	   the	   motivations	  
shaping	  the	  character	  of	  the	  war	  we	  are	  about	  to	  embark	  on.32	  Only	  by	  judging	  correctly	  in	  this	  
regard	  can	  we	  gain	  an	  accurate	  sense	  of	  how	  far	  we	  may	  depart	   from	  our	  maximum	  military	  
effort	  without	  running	  undue	  risks	  of	  defeat.	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POLITICAL	  PHILOSOPHY	  AND	  GAME	  THEORY	  
In	   this	   section	   I	   present	   some	   alternative	   strategic	   formulations	   that	   are	   nevertheless	  
compatible	   with	   Clausewitz’s	   position	   on	   strategy	   as	   set	   out	   above.	   These	   formulations	   are	  
associated	  with	   the	   fields	  of	  political	  philosophy	  and	  game	  theory,	   in	  both	  of	  which	  strategy	  
emerges	   as	   a	   response	   to	   the	   tension	   that	   exists	   between	   the	   competing	   imperatives	  of	   self-­‐
preservation	  and	  co-­‐operation	  under	  anarchy.	  As	  such,	  they	  provide	  clearer	  and	  more	  concise	  
accounts	   of	   the	   dynamics	   underpinning	   strategic	   decision-­‐making	   than	   does	   Clausewitz.	  
Nevertheless	   the	   degree	   of	   consilience	   they	   all	   share	   suggests	   that,	   whatever	   else	   may	   be	  
problematic	  in	  Clausewitz’s	  account	  of	  war,	  his	  basic	  strategic	  insights	  are	  sound.	  
	  	  	  	  	  Thomas	  Hobbes	  famously	  characterizes	  war	  as	  the	  condition	  of	  humankind	  under	  anarchy.	  
In	  the	  absence	  of	  political	  authority,	  he	  argues,	   interpersonal	  relations	  are	  prone	  to	  violence.	  
Where	  no	  mechanism	  exists	  for	  policing	  behaviour,	  people	  are	  constantly	  faced	  with	  the	  fear	  
of	   violent	   death;	   to	  meet	   a	   stranger	   is	   to	   confront	   the	   possible	   source	   of	   one’s	   own	  demise.	  
Thus	   when	   such	   a	   threat	   presents	   itself,	   the	   temptation	   is	   to	   remove	   it	   by	   means	   of	   pre-­‐
emptive	  attack—even	   if	  co-­‐operation	  would	  otherwise	  be	  desirable.	  Little	  wonder,	   then,	   that	  
Hobbes	   views	   human	   co-­‐operation	   as	   extremely	   difficult,	   if	   not	   wholly	   impossible,	   under	  
anarchy.	   Co-­‐operation	   in	   these	   circumstances	   implies	   that	   force	   be	   withheld.	   This	   in	   turn	  
implies	  a	  willingness	  to	  accept	  some	  degree	  of	  risk,	  for	  we	  cannot	  guarantee	  that	  restraint	  on	  
our	  part	  will	  be	  reciprocated	   in	  kind.	  Hobbes	  resolves	   this	   tension	  by	  means	  of	   the	  state,	  an	  
overarching	  and	  impartial	  power	  capable	  of	  punishing	  aggression	  by	  its	  citizens.	  Under	  these	  
circumstances,	  co-­‐operation	  between	  individuals	  is	  more	  readily	  achieved	  because	  restraint	  in	  
one’s	  dealings	  with	  others	  no	   longer	  confers	   the	  same	  degree	  of	  vulnerability	  as	   it	  did	  under	  
anarchy.	  We	   can	   withhold	   violence,	   and	   extend	   co-­‐operation,	   confident	   that	   others	   will	   do	  
likewise.33	  
	  	  	  	  	  As	  Hobbes	  himself	  acknowledges,	  his	  solution	  to	  the	  problem	  of	  anarchy	  does	  not	  so	  much	  
dispel	   it	   as	   move	   it	   elsewhere.	   Whereas	   co-­‐operation	   is	   possible	   within	   states,	   it	   is	   more	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difficult	  between	  states	  because	  there	   is	  no	  sovereign	  body	  above	  them.	  Accordingly,	  each	  of	  
them	  must	  be	  careful	  around	   its	  neighbours.	  Hobbes	   is	  not	  really	  concerned	  with	   inter-­‐state	  
relations	  although	  he	  does	  pause	   to	   register	  his	  perception	  of	   their	   general	   character,	   in	   the	  
process	  making	  Leviathan	  a	  foundational	  text	  for	  Realists.	  
Kings,	   and	   Persons	   of	   Soveraigne	   authority,	   because	   of	   their	   Independency,	   are	   in	  
continuall	   jealousies,	   and	   in	   the	   state	   and	  posture	  of	  Gladiators;	   having	   their	  weapons	  
pointing,	  and	   their	  eyes	   fixed	  on	  one	  another;	   that	   is,	   their	  Forts,	  Garrisons,	  and	  Guns	  
upon	   the	   Frontiers	   of	   their	   Kingdomes;	   and	   continuall	   Spyes	   upon	   their	   neighbours,	  
which	  is	  a	  posture	  of	  War.34	  
Even	  here,	  however,	  Hobbes	  hints	  at	  some	  reasons	  why	  states	  may	  not	  experience	  the	  logic	  of	  
pre-­‐emptive	  violence	  as	  acutely	  as	   individuals.	  Not	  every	  citizen	  need	  be	  a	   spy;	   a	  division	  of	  
labour	   is	   possible	   here	   leaving	   the	   majority	   free	   to	   do	   other	   things.	   Additionally,	   fortified	  
frontiers	   can	  buy	   time	   for	   full	  mobilization	   to	   occur	   after	  war	   breaks	   out.	   This	   removes	   the	  
requirement	  for	  states	  to	  maintain	  their	  forces	  on	  hair-­‐trigger	  alert,	  in	  the	  process	  reducing	  the	  
perceived	   threat	   they	   represent	   to	   their	   neighbours.	   Thus,	   although	   for	   Hobbes	   humanity	  
never	   transcends	   its	  egoistic	  nature,	  political	  and	  material	   structures	  can	  serve	   to	  ameliorate	  
the	  negative	  consequences	  of	  this.	  
	  	  	  	  	  Hobbes’	  account	  of	  the	  tension	  between	  self-­‐preservation	  and	  co-­‐operation	  is	  not	  the	  only	  
one	  in	  this	  tradition.	  David	  Hume	  also	  analyses	  a	  number	  of	  analogous	  situations,	  even	  if	  they	  
are	  not	   framed	   in	   quite	   so	   dramatic	   a	  manner.	  One	  of	   these	   involves	   two	   rowers	  who	  must	  
both	  contribute	  physical	  effort	  in	  order	  to	  make	  progress	  in	  a	  shared	  boat.	  Both	  appreciate	  as	  
much,	  but	  both	  also	  realize	  their	  own	  effort	  will	  be	  wasted	  should	  their	  partner	  not	  respond	  in	  
kind.	   In	   this	   latter	   case	   the	   boat	   will	  make	   no	   progress,	   but	   the	   non-­‐rower	   will	   at	   least	   be	  
better	   off	   than	   the	   rower	   on	   account	   of	   not	   having	   wasted	   any	   effort.	   Thus	   although	   the	  
optimum	  outcome	  is	  for	  both	  to	  bend	  to	  their	  oars,	  mutual	  suspicion	  means	  that	  neither	  will	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necessarily	  do	  so.	  Hume	  does	  not	  invoke	  the	  state	  to	  put	  a	  stop	  to	  such	  problems.	  Instead	  he	  
notes	   that	   people	   in	   boats	   co-­‐operate	   in	   accordance	   with	   an	   unspoken	   agreement	   or	  
convention.	   As	   rational	   beings	   we	   can	   discern	   the	   long-­‐term	   advantages	   associated	   with	  
forming	  and	  observing	  such	  conventions	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  superior	  co-­‐operative	  outcomes	  they	  
make	  possible.	  Although	  we	  may	  remain	  desirous	  of	  making	  immediate	  gains	  at	  the	  expense	  of	  
others,	  reason	  dictates	  otherwise.35	  Hume,	  in	  other	  words,	  provides	  a	  more	  optimistic	  account	  
of	  our	  nature	  than	  does	  Hobbes.	  Conventions	  serve	  to	  extend	  and	  reinforce	  our	  co-­‐operative	  
tendencies,	  rather	  than	  to	  police	  or	  otherwise	  obstruct	  purely	  egoistic	  behaviour.	  If	  Hobbes	  is	  a	  
realist	  then	  Hume	  is	  more	  akin	  to	  a	  liberal	  institutionalist:	  he	  believes	  in	  the	  potency	  of	  social	  
facts.	  
	  	  	  	  	  For	  his	  part,	  Jean	  Jacques	  Rousseau	  addresses	  the	  tension	  between	  self-­‐preservation	  and	  co-­‐
operation	   by	   means	   of	   a	   scenario	   known	   as	   the	   “Stag	   Hunt”.	   Only	   if	   two	   people	   hunt	   co-­‐
operatively	  can	  they	  hope	  to	  catch	  a	  stag.	  There	  are	  also	  hares	  around,	  and	  each	  hunter	  stands	  
a	  good	  chance	  of	  bagging	  one	  alone.	  Going	  after	  a	  hare	  will,	  however,	  alert	  any	  nearby	  stags	  to	  
their	  peril,	  thereby	  ensuring	  the	  other	  hunter	  catches	  nothing.	  Thus	  even	  though	  a	  stag	  would	  
provide	  more	  meals	  than	  a	  hare,	  each	  hunter	  will	  be	  tempted	  to	  go	  after	  the	  latter	  in	  order	  to	  
minimize	   the	   risk	   of	   catching	   nothing	   at	   all.36	  For	   Rousseau	   the	   Stag	   Hunt	   exemplifies	   the	  
corrupting	   nature	   of	   social	   relations	   in	   action,	   as	   individuals	   learn	   to	   predicate	   their	   own	  
behaviour	  on	  the	  anticipated	  behaviour	  of	  others	  for	  purposes	  of	  self-­‐preservation.	  
	  	  	  	  	  I	   mention	   Rousseau	   here	   because	   his	   Stag	   Hunt	   has	   since	   been	   formalized	   by	   game-­‐
theorists	  with	  a	  related	  interest	  in	  the	  prospects	  for	  co-­‐operation	  amidst	  conflict.	  In	  this	  regard	  
they	   might	   just	   as	   well	   have	   taken	   inspiration	   from	   Hobbes	   or	   Hume,	   because	   all	   three	  
philosophers	  are	  addressing	  instances	  of	  what	  such	  theorists	  might	  describe	  as	  interdependent	  
choice	  under	  uncertainty.37	  In	  game	  theory,	  our	  choices	  are	  said	  to	  be	  interdependent	  when	  our	  
optimum	  course	  of	  action	  depends	  on	  the	  choices	  available	  to	  our	  adversary.	  Identifying	  this	  
optimum	  course	  of	  action	  therefore	  requires	   that	  we	  anticipate	  our	  adversary’s	   response	  and	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allow	  for	  it	  in	  our	  deliberations.	  And	  in	  doing	  so	  we	  must	  recognize	  that	  this	  response	  will,	  in	  
its	   turn,	   be	   governed	   by	   his	   expectations	   about	   how	  we	   shall	   respond	   to	   him.	   Under	   these	  
circumstances	   the	  uncertainty	   resides	   in	   the	  other	  party’s	  ultimate	   intentions:	  we	   cannot	  be	  
sure	   exactly	  what	   he	  wishes	   to	   achieve,	   and	   thus	  what	   choices	   he	  will	  make	   in	   response	   to	  
ours.	   What	   Hobbes,	   Hume	   and	   Rousseau	   are	   saying—and	   what	   game	   theory	   likewise	  
demonstrates—is	  that	  this	  uncertainty	  encourages	  prudent	  choices	  calculated	  to	  minimize	  the	  
harm	  that	  another	  party’s	  actions	  can	  cause	  us,	  rather	  than	  choices	  intended	  to	  maximize	  the	  
benefits	   we	   can	   achieve	   through	   co-­‐operation.	   We	   eschew	   actions	   predicated	   on	   the	  
assumption	   of	   co-­‐operation	   in	   favour	   of	   those	   calculated	   to	   protect	   us	   against	   the	   worst	  
consequences	  of	  such	  assumptions	  proving	  wrong.	  We	  attack	  rather	  than	  befriend;	  we	  refuse	  
to	  row	  rather	  than	  combining	  our	  efforts;	  we	  hunt	  hare	  rather	  than	  stag.	  
	  	  	  	  	  We	  can	  relate	  these	  concerns	  back	  to	  military	  matters	  via	  Thomas	  Schelling’s	  famous	  work	  
on	  strategic	  stability,	  because	  the	  scenarios	  he	  discusses	  are	  fundamentally	   identical	  to	  those	  
described	  above.	  Two	  powers	   locked	   in	  a	  nuclear	  standoff	  may	  have	  no	  desire	   for	  war,	  given	  
the	   terrible	   consequences	   for	   all	   involved.	   But	   in	   order	   to	   forgo	   war,	   both	   sides	   must	   be	  
confident	   they	   are	   not	   vulnerable	   to	   a	   surprise	   attack	   capable	   of	   disarming	   them.	   In	   the	  
absence	   of	   such	   confidence,	   the	   temptation	   will	   be	   to	   attack	   first	   in	   order	   to	   forestall	   the	  
other’s	  attack—even	  if	  war	  is	  otherwise	  highly	  undesirable.	  This	  leads	  Schelling	  to	  recommend	  
various	  initiatives	  calculated	  to	  bolster	  stability.	  Reliable	  early-­‐warning	  systems	  should	  reduce	  
the	  possibility	  of	  surprise;	  well-­‐protected	  retaliatory	  forces	  should	  reduce	  the	  chances	  of	  being	  
disarmed—as	   should	   a	   mutual	   commitment	   to	   eschew	   highly	   accurate	   weapons	   capable	   of	  
counter-­‐force	  missions,	  in	  favour	  of	  less-­‐accurate	  alternatives	  capable	  only	  of	  destroying	  cities.	  
Under	  these	  conditions	  there	  should	  be	  less	  incentive	  to	  strike	  first	  because	  neither	  side	  could	  
hope	   to	   disarm	   the	   other	   and	   thereby	   prevent	   him	   from	   retaliating.	   Schelling	   is,	   in	   other	  
words,	  advocating	  the	  creation	  of	  structural	  impediments	  to	  behaviour	  capable	  of	  reducing	  the	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mutual	   fear	   of	   surprise	   attack. 38 	  In	   the	   absence	   of	   a	   leviathan,	   he	   recommends	   the	  
implementation	  of	  a	  technical	  fix.	  
	  
BACK	  TO	  CLAUSEWITZ	  
With	   the	   foregoing	  matters	   in	  mind,	   it	   seems	   clear	   enough	   that	   the	   opening	   chapter	   of	  On	  
War	  provides	  us	  with	  Clausewitz’s	  own	  attempt	  to	  think	  through	  the	  military	  ramifications	  of	  
interdependent	   choice	   under	   uncertainty.	   His	   overarching	   argument	   is	   confused	   and	   lacks	  
clarity,	   but	   his	   ideas	   on	   strategy	   that	   emerge	   from	   the	   muddle	   display	   a	   high	   degree	   of	  
consilience	  with	  those	  of	  Hobbes	  et	  al.	  The	  use	  of	  force	  in	  war	  tends	  to	  extremes	  because	  we	  
are	  concerned	  to	  avoid	  being	  outdone	  in	  this	  regard	  by	  our	  adversary.	  Concurrently,	  we	  both	  
wish	   to	   restrain	   the	   costs	   of	   fighting	   so	   as	   to	   maximize	   the	   net	   benefit	   associated	   with	  
achieving	  our	  chosen	  political	  ends.	  In	  principle,	  therefore,	  it	  may	  be	  possible	  for	  both	  sides	  to	  
co-­‐operate	  by	  moderating	  their	  military	  efforts	  in	  light	  of	  the	  political	  sacrifices	  they	  require	  of	  
each	  other.	  Following	  Gallie,	  the	  situation	  need	  not	  elicit	  extreme	  efforts	  on	  both	  sides;	  much	  
depends	  on	  how	  confidently	  each	  party	  can	  reasonably	  expect	  that	  its	  own	  self-­‐restraint	  will	  be	  
reciprocated	  in	  kind.	  
	  	  	  	  	  On	  this	  latter	  point	  Clausewitz	  is	  particularly	  insightful.	  He	  notes	  that	  strategic	  choices	  rest	  
not	  on	  logical	  generalizations	  so	  much	  as	  on	  specific	  data	  about	  the	  concrete	  circumstances	  at	  
hand.	  This	  data	  will,	  however,	  be	  incomplete,	  creating	  an	  uncertain	  picture	  whose	  gaps	  must	  
be	  filled	  via	  the	  exercise	  of	  judgement.	  As	  Clausewitz	  himself	  puts	  it,	  from	  “the	  character,	  the	  
institutions,	   the	   condition,	   the	   circumstances	   of	   the	   adversary,	   each	   side	   will	   anticipate,	   in	  
accordance	  with	  the	  laws	  of	  probability,	  the	  likely	  actions	  of	  the	  other	  and	  determine	  his	  own	  
accordingly.”39	  Much,	  therefore,	  will	  depend	  on	  how	  accurate	  our	  judgements	  turn	  out	  to	  be.40	  
	  	  	  	  	  The	   influence	   of	   Clausewitz’s	   “modifications	   in	   reality”	   fit	   readily	   enough	   into	   this	  
framework.	  Paying	  attention	  to	  an	  adversary’s	  previous	  behaviour	  in	  analogous	  situations	  may	  
help	  reduce	  uncertainty	  about	  what	  to	  expect	  this	  time	  around;	  the	  unfolding	  of	  operations	  in	  
	  18	   	  
space	  and	  time	  provides	  opportunities	  to	  infer	  enemy	  intentions	  and	  revise	  one’s	  own	  efforts	  
accordingly;	  the	  prospect	  of	  enemy	  gains	  being	  reversed	  at	  some	  future	  date	  can	  reconcile	  the	  
losing	  side	  to	  cut	  costs	  and	  recognize	  defeat.	  So	  too	  can	  the	  advantages	  accruing	  to	  the	  defence	  




Clausewitz	   has	   a	   great	   deal	   to	   tell	   us	   about	   war	   in	   general,	   and	   also	   about	   its	   strategic	  
dimension.	  It	  has	  not	  been	  my	  intention	  to	  argue	  otherwise.	  Nevertheless,	  the	  initial	  chapter	  of	  
On	  War	  is	  not	  the	  best	  starting	  place	  for	  those	  wishing	  to	  understand	  the	  dynamics	  of	  strategic	  
interaction.	  Clausewitz,	  it	  is	  true,	  does	  eventually	  hit	  upon	  these	  dynamics,	  but	  the	  reasoning	  
that	  led	  him	  there	  lacks	  clarity	  because	  it	  is	  unsound.	  Gallie,	  whilst	  complimentary	  about	  other	  
aspects	   of	   Clausewitz’s	   theorizing,	   characterized	   his	   attempts	   to	   reconcile	   absolute	   and	   real	  
war	   as	   “an	   ideal	   hunting	   ground	   for	   students	   of	   philosophical	   logic”,	   and	   it	   is	   difficult	   to	  
disagree	  with	  him	  in	  this	  regard.41	  
	  	  	  	  	  What,	  then,	  does	  this	  mean	  for	  Clausewitz’s	  place	  in	  the	  study	  of	  military	  strategy?	  It	  seems	  
to	   me	   that	   we	   should	   not	   follow	   him	   in	   seeking	   to	   deduce	   our	   understanding	   of	   strategic	  
fundamentals	  from	  the	  nature	  of	  war	  itself.	  On	  the	  contrary,	  we	  might	  well	  do	  better	  to	  treat	  
war	   (or,	  at	  any	  rate,	  warfare)	  as	  a	  particular	  expression	  of	  strategic	   interaction.	  This	  much	   is	  
implied	   in	   our	   earlier	   discussion	   of	   political	   philosophy	   and	   game	   theory,	   which	   drew	  
attention	  to	  the	  general	  phenomenon	  of	  interdependent	  choice	  under	  uncertainty,	  and	  to	  the	  
presence	   of	   analogous	   ideas	   in	   Clausewitz’s	   thinking.	   In	   doing	   so	   we	   are	   not	   rejecting	   his	  
teachings	  outright,	  but	  basing	  our	  study	  of	  strategy	  on	  clearer	  and	  more	  concise	  foundations.	  
Having	  done	  so,	  we	  should	  then	  turn	  to	  Clausewitz	  for	  his	  profound	  insights	  into	  the	  specifics	  
of	   strategic	   interaction	   in	  military	   contexts.	   To	   revisit	   the	   opening	   passage	   of	   this	   essay:	  we	  
should	  not	  seek	  to	  go	  beyond	  Clausewitz,	  so	  much	  as	  begin	  somewhere	  else	  first.	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